Taken in its entirety from AACSB's Biz Ed magazine Nov/Dec 2012 issue "Where Technology meets Business", www.e-digitaleditions.com/i/90487/51
(Research paper, "Analyst Coverage, Information, and Bubbles", on SSRN, June 2012)
Market bubbles like the one that preceded the
recent housing collapse could be mitigated or even
prevented if governments and regulatory bodies shared
information with the public about factors that determine
an asset’s value. This is the finding of research by
Timothy Burch and Sandro Andrade of the University
of Miami School of Business Administration in Florida,
and Jiangze Bian of the University of International
Business and Economics in Beijing (Wikipedia), China.
The group examined China’s stock market during a
six-month period in 2007 when stock
prices nearly tripled and trading activity
nearly quadrupled. They found
that stocks with the most analyst coverage
had significantly smaller bubbles
than those with no analyst coverage.
For example, stocks with 20 analysts
reporting on them had bubbles that
were more than 60 percent smaller
than stocks with no analyst coverage.
“Our research shows that making
relevant information about an asset
readily available reduces disagreement,
which in turn makes bubbles
less severe,” says Burch.
The researchers suggest that to
limit bubbles in the stock market,
government agencies could collect and disseminate information
and even subsidize analyst research where needed.
To reduce the odds and severity of real estate market
bubbles, governments and regulatory agencies could
disseminate information about transactions, appraisals,
rental yields, vacancies, demographic/migration trends,
prospective changes in zoning laws, and real-property
borrowing statistics.
“This could be achieved by creating a ‘Kelley Blue
Book’ for real estate—a centralized, well-promoted
Web site where everyone could go before making real
estate decisions,” says Andrade.
“Analyst Coverage, Information, and Bubbles” is
forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Qualitative
Analysis.
Abstract:
This paper uses the unique setting of the 2007 stock market bubble in China to examine whether information dissemination mitigates bubbles. Using multiple measures of bubble intensity for each stock, we find significantly smaller bubbles in stocks with greater analyst coverage. The abating effect of analyst coverage on bubble intensity is weaker when there is greater disagreement among analysts. This suggests that, in line with resale option theories of bubbles, one channel through which analyst coverage mitigates bubbles is by coordinating investors' beliefs. Consistent with this particular information mechanism, stock turnover is negatively correlated with analyst coverage, and the abating effect of analyst coverage on stock turnover is weaker when there is more disagreement among analysts.
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