Co-Winner of a 2010 Gold Medal in the Axiom Business Book Awards in the category of Entrepreneurship. Winner of the 2009 PROSE Award for Excellence - Business, Finance & Management
Silicon Valley, Singapore, Tel Aviv--the global hubs of
entrepreneurial activity--all bear the marks of government investment.
Yet, for every public intervention that spurs entrepreneurial activity,
there are many failed efforts that waste untold billions in taxpayer
dollars. When has governmental sponsorship succeeded in boosting growth,
and when has it fallen terribly short? Should the government be
involved in such undertakings at all? Boulevard of Broken Dreams
is the first extensive look at the ways governments have supported
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists across decades and continents.
Josh Lerner, one of the foremost experts in the field, provides valuable
insights into why some public initiatives work while others are hobbled
by pitfalls, and he offers suggestions for how public ventures should
be implemented in the future.
Discussing the complex history of
Silicon Valley and other pioneering centers of venture capital, Lerner
uncovers the extent of government influence in prompting growth. He
examines the public strategies used to advance new ventures, points to
the challenges of these endeavors, and reveals the common flaws
undermining far too many programs--poor design, a lack of understanding
for the entrepreneurial process, and implementation problems. Lerner
explains why governments cannot dictate how venture markets evolve, and
why they must balance their positions as catalysts with an awareness of
their limited ability to stimulate the entrepreneurial sector.
As governments worldwide seek to spur economic growth in ever more aggressive ways, Boulevard of Broken Dreams
offers an important caution. The book argues for a careful approach to
government support of entrepreneurial activities, so that the mistakes
of earlier efforts are not repeated.
Josh Lerner is the
Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking at Harvard Business
School, with a joint appointment in finance and entrepreneurial
management. He is the coauthor of Innovation and Its Discontents (Princeton), The Venture Capital Cycle, and other books.
"[S]uperb."--Edward L. Glaeser, New York Times' Economix blog
of governments would like to promote high-tech entrepreneurship and
venture capital in their regions--but many don't know how to do it
effectively. In his new book Boulevard of Broken Dreams, Josh
Lerner . . . examines which types of policies to promote
entrepreneurship and venture capital tend to work--and which don't.
Lerner supports his carefully researched analysis with numerous examples
chosen from around the globe."--MIT Sloan Management Review
Also last week, Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault declared government support for the 23-partner Campus Paris-Saclay, the most ambitious Operation Campus cluster which has now become part of the ‘Grand Paris’ urban development plan.
Concluding the 7th Forum of Research and Innovation in Paris, Ayrault
confirmed funding of €1 billion for construction to unite the
universities, grandes écoles and research organisations
comprising Paris-Saclay; plus €850 million under Operation Campus; and
an extra €1 billion under the Investments of the Future Idex
(Initiatives of Excellence) programme.
Due for completion in 2014, Paris-Saclay would be a “merger remarkable
for its size and quality” with “more than 10,000 researchers and
academics, nearly 50,000 students, including 30,000 studying for masters
and doctorates”, said Ayrault...
...Acknowledging the importance of jumpstarting the economy and getting people back to work, President Obama plans to lay out a jobs agenda in a speech to Congress on Thursday.
KnowledgeToday asked several Wharton professors to each propose one idea for getting people back to work.
Peter Cappelli, director of Wharton’s Center for Human Resources and professor of management: “The most successful government policy for encouraging jobs is hiring subsidies — programs where the government gives employers some kind of subsidy for each new hire they make, usually in the form of a tax break of some kind. There has been extensive research on these programs, especially in Europe where they have been popular, and they work better than anything else at promoting new jobs. They have been tried in various forms in the U.S., mainly to help disadvantaged workers get into the labor market, but they were also used after the 1991 recession to promote hiring. While the results have not been spectacular, they are better than any other option under consideration.”
Mauro Guillén, director of the Joseph H. Lauder Institute and professor of management: “There are two types of unemployment — long-term and short-term. It is impossible to design effective policies that do not distinguish between the two...
Page 37 and 38 have a list of the more than 30 scholars and policymakers from around the world who gathered in Philadelphia for a two-day conference.
The financial and economic crisis has heightened everyone’s awareness of systemic risk. Confidence in the ability of decision-makers, policymakers and institutions to handle such risks has been shattered. Psychology, a culture of destructive self-interest, and social processes have also been invoked as part of a complex set of conditions that led to the debacle. In turn, the crisis has accelerated some prevailing demographic, economic, and social trends, including population aging, political tensions, geopolitical instability and environmental degradation, as the focus of attention has unavoidably shifted towards short-term, immediate concerns. The crisis has placed the issue of systemic risk at the top of the global agenda, forcing analysts and policymakers to make a stark distinction between what is important and what is actually urgent.
In this white paper we provide an overview of the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to the problem of risk, focusing on economic and financial aspects, while also paying attention to political, social and environmental risks associated with the crisis and its aftermath. The analysis represents the outcome of a collective, multi-disciplinary effort at understanding risk by a group of more than 30 scholars and policymakers from around the world who gathered in Philadelphia for a two-day conference.
The analysis begins with the conventional explanations of the crisis, further adding political considerations, institutional constraints, psychology, and social processes. This prepares the stage for the assessment of the effectiveness of policy interventions during the crisis which, while averting a massive meltdown, generated a number of additional problems, both short-term and long-term. Failures in global governance and in understanding complex ripple effects are also explored. Risks building up in emerging economies—from financial to political and demographic—are presented as a stark reminder that global instability is punctuated by a growing number of troubled hot spots.
The conference participants identified four action items. First, global governance needs to be enhanced, a task that is not easy as a changing of the guard takes place due to the ascendancy of the emerging economies. Second, regulation must both set parameters for self-regulation and establish a set of cushions, bells and whistles to ameliorate the possibility of further systemic crises. Third, policymakers and scholars ought to adopt a more humble attitude in terms of the extent to which they are able to understand and overcome the complexities posed by crises. And fourth, as people adopt shorter time horizons due to incentives, demographics, politics, and cognitive biases, it is important to remain on the alert for the weaknesses and faults in the global economic, political, and social architecture.
As the deadline approaches for the US Congress to either raise the debt ceiling or enter into technical default on the huge US public debt, what appears to characterize the debate is a lack of concern for what will happen if the deadline is missed.
Republicans, determined not to raise taxes, refuse to approve any compromise that would violate that objective. Democrats, reluctant to make deep reforms to social programs, want most adjustments to happen on the revenues side. The deadlock has held firm even under the time pressure of looming nonpayment on the debt.